Microcipurile din pastile le-ar putea permite in curand doctorilor sa afle daca pacientii lor au luat medicamentele prescrise. Senzorii digerabili, de doar un milimetru, ii vor ajuta pe medici si chirurgi sa-si monitorizeze pacientii in afara spitalelor si a salilor de operatie. Noile medicamente le-ar putea fi de folos mai ales celor bolnavi psihic sau pacientilor varstnici care se bazeaza pe o schema medicamentoasa complicata si care se afla intr-un mare pericol daca uita sa ia o pastila sau nu o iau atunci cand trebuie, relateaza “Daily Mail” in editia electronica de duminica.
Pastila “inteligenta”, care ar putea fi folosita si de bolnavii cronici pentru a vedea daca medicamentele scumpe pe care le folosesc isi fac efectul scontat sau, dimpotriva, au efecte secundare potential periculoase, functioneaza printr-o incarcatura electrica inofensiva activata in momentul in care stomacul digera medicamentul. Aceasta informatie si altele, vizand de exemplu ritmul cardiac si obtinute cu ajutorul unor senzori aplicati pe stomacul sau spatele pacientului, sunt transmise ulterior pe telefonul mobil al acestuia si apoi pe internet cu ajutorul tehnologiei wireless. Doctorii si pacientii pot abtine astfel o imagine completa privind starea de sanatate si impactul medicamentelor.
Microcipurile de silicon sunt invizibile pacientilor si pot fi introduse in toate medicamentele obisnuite in decursul procesului lor de productie. Doua companii farmaceutice importante investigheaza deja aceasta tehnologie, dezvoltata de compania americana Proteus Biomedical. Primele teste urmeaza sa fie efectuate in Marea Britanie in decurs de maximum 12 luni. Alina OLTEANU / ZIUA Online
Comentarii importante ale cititorilor Daily Mail:
In addition to the information supplied in this article, the phamaceutical companies in the states have already made provisions to start using this technology as early as 2010! There will be no more skipping your meds because the dose is too strong. This is a problem I had and when I told my doctor she just said no other patient had complained of this problem etc. Well, I say they are aware and use prescription meds to deprive patients from sleep or overmedicate them. This technology will definitely go against the interests of the patients and protect those of the pharmaceutical companies. – Luther R. Norman, Seattle, Washington USA, 12/4/2009 11:10
I’m having nothing microchipped from this government or its stooges thanks, least of all me. Cant see anyone taking this offer up…why would we want alien things in our bodies? – Mindcatcher, London, 12/4/2009 3:57
Emperor’s New Clothes – again. These people should not be expected to self medicate! There should be medical staff to look after these people. Perhaps the money spent on this chip could be used better utilising nursing staff. ‘Secure website’ yeah right! So the mobile phone is also a necessity! – Paul Carusso, Scunthorpe, United Kingdom, 12/4/2009 11:26
Whoa, microchips? Yeah of course that will be ‘only’ used to say when you have taken your meds… I don’t think. So when will we be forced to have this by this government!!! NO – Kerry, Warrington, UK, 12/4/2009 11:37
In modern NuLab Britain beset by PC culture and human rights rubbish what is the point if the doctor does find out a patient hasn’t been taken his medication? If forced to do so the human rights lunatics will step in. It’s irrelevant that such a patient is wasting doctors’ time and NHS funds. ‘Uman Rights! – Terence, Hereford, UK, 12/4/2009 11:44
Nope, sorry, this is entirely unworkeable and unfinanceable and will remain so for decades. Having said that, I have no doubt there has been a great deal of research grant money thrown at the research bodies involved which has encouraged extensive corroboration andcollaborative non-definitive trialling.
– M Davies, Cardiff, 12/4/2009 12:23
How very strange and creepy. It is yet more controlling surveillance, which will be of no help to the individual. To portray it as ’empowering’ for the patient is perverse. – kate, Leeds, 12/4/2009 12:44
I don’t need a michro chip to remind me to take all of my daily medication, I have my beautiful, loving wife who does that for me. Sue I will love you forever.
– Chas, London, 12/4/2009 13:46
How very strange and creepy. It is yet more controlling surveillance, which will be of no help to the individual. To portray it as ’empowering’ for the patient is perverse. – kate, Leeds, 12/4/2009 12:44
Nope, sorry, this is entirely unworkeable and unfinanceable and will remain so for decades.
Having said that, I have no doubt there has been a great deal of research grant money thrown at the research bodies involved which has encouraged extensive corroboration andcollaborative non-definitive trialling. – M Davies, Cardiff, 12/4/2009 12:23
Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Kathleen Kraninger, Screening Coordination, and Director Robert A. Mocny, US-VISIT, National Protection and Programs Directorate, before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, “Biometric Identification”
Release Date: March 19, 2009
Rayburn House Office Building (Remarks as Prepared)
“Chairman Price, Ranking Member Rogers, and other distinguished Members, we are pleased to appear before you today to discuss how the use of biometrics and identity management programs enhances our Nation’s security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to refine our capabilities to identify accurately and more efficiently process individuals at the border, in airports, and across our screening programs. The Screening Coordination Office (SCO) within the DHS Office of Policy was established to integrate, where appropriate, the wide range of DHS screening and credentialing activities to enhance our missions of keeping dangerous people and things out of the U.S. and securing critical infrastructure. US-VISIT provides the Department’s biometrics identification and analysis services to agencies throughout the immigration and border management, law enforcement and intelligence communities. US-VISIT supports the Department’s mission by providing biometric identification services to Federal, State and local government decision-makers to help them accurately identify people and assess risk.
Access to our nation is critical for a terrorist to plan and carry out attacks on our homeland. As the 9/11 Commission’s Final Report states, “Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack. To them, international travel presents great danger because they must surface to pass through regulated channels to present themselves to border security officials, or attempt to circumvent inspection points.” As the Department continues to implement and integrate key screening programs, the establishment of an integrated immigration and border screening system represents a significant achievement that has improved national security.
The Value of Biometrics The Department began to collect digital fingerprints and photographs from international visitors applying for visas or arriving at U.S. ports of entry (POE) in 2004 to help immigration officials make visa-issuance and admission decisions. With biographic screening capabilities already well established, biometrics became the next logical step in the evolution of identity management. Unlike names and dates of birth, biometrics are unique and extremely difficult to forge. They provide a reliable, convenient, and accurate way to establish and verify visitors’ identities. Moreover, biometrics are a scalable technology and can be upgraded to stay one step ahead of terrorists and criminals. Biometrics help us meet the challenge of making travel difficult for those who want to do us harm, while making it convenient and efficient for legitimate visitors.
Through its use of biometrics, the Department’s US-VISIT program collects, stores, and shares digital fingerscans and digital photographs for subsequent verification. This biometric information is paired with biographic information pertaining to an individual and used to establish and verify that individual’s identity.
We want to reinforce the critical progress we have made by discussing key capabilities that biometrics provide: greater security, increased efficiency, and a new level of identity assurance.
The Department’s implementation of biometrics capabilities has laid the foundation for the rapid expansion of biometric identification to other agencies. Today, this biometric coordination across the Government is making our screening more collaborative, more streamlined, and more effective than ever before.
Five years ago, our immigration and border management system had disparate information systems that lacked coordination. Today, the Department is unifying these systems to promote a centralized source for biometric-based information on criminals, immigration violators, and known or suspected terrorists.
Five years ago, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) lacked timely and accurate information about visitors who overstay their visas. Today, US-VISIT provides more than 250 credible leads weekly to ICE, enabling that organization to better enforce our immigration laws. Through ICE’s Secure Communities Program, we are also helping to identify immigration violators arrested by State and local law enforcement.
Five years ago, the United States was alone in applying biometrics to the immigration and border management communities. Today, the United Kingdom and Japan already have robust programs using biometrics. The European Union, Canada, Mexico, Australia, Argentina, Peru and many other countries are in various stages of applying biometrics to immigration control.
Five years ago, we were relying on visual inspection of travel documents to try to identify those that were fraudulent. Today, because of increased information sharing within DHS and with the Department of State (DOS), along with the use of biometrics and machine-readable travel documents, we are able to more quickly identify fraudulent documents. As an example, DHS and DOS partnered in developing the e-passport, which set a new international standard for the security features of a travel document, and the passport card, providing U.S. citizens a secure, limited-use travel document in a more convenient format.
As you know, DHS is preparing for the June 1, 2009, implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), which will require U.S. and Canadian citizens to present standardized, secure documentation denoting identity and citizenship for entry at the U.S. land and sea ports of entry. WHTI addresses the vulnerabilities inherent when travelers can present a wide range of documents that are highly susceptible to fraud and cannot be verified. WHTI- compliant documents available to U.S. citizens (the passport book, passport card, Trusted Traveler Program cards, and Enhanceds Driver’s Licenses) are issued in a secure manner and include a biometric (digital photograph) on the face of the card. The WHTI solution is transforming the border by moving away from a vehicle-centric system to a person-centric one.
Radio-frequency identification technology embedded in most WHTI-compliant travel documents, with the appropriate privacy protections and infrastructure, allow DHS the ability to verify an individual’s identity and perform real-time queries against lookout databases even before the traveler pulls up to the inspection booth. The trained DHS officer can compare the digital photograph and biographic information on the document to the traveler in front of them, as well as to the photograph and information on the DHS border officer’s screen that is provided by the document’s issuer—all of which assist the officer in making better decisions about an individual’s admissibility to our country.
While implementing the screening programs across the Department, DHS has maintained focus on the four guiding principles first established for US-VISIT, which are to:
Enhance the security of our citizens and visitors; Facilitate legitimate travel and trade; Ensure the integrity of our immigration system; and Protect the privacy of our visitors. Screening and Credentialing Programs DHS continues to identify opportunities to harmonize and enhance screening processes for both security and efficiency reasons across DHS programs. In doing so, we must rationalize and prioritize investments in screening technologies and systems while recognizing that each program faces individual challenges, operates in different environments, and adheres to its respective legal authorities.
In July 2008, DHS finalized the DHS Credentialing Framework Initiative (CFI) to guide the selection and coordination of credentialing activities and investments throughout DHS. In developing the CFI, the SCO led a DHS-wide effort to analyze and compare key programs across the credentialing lifecycle of registration and enrollment, eligibility vetting and risk assessment, issuance, and expiration and revocation; identify the relationships between the credentialing processes and business capabilities and the Information Technology services related to screening and credentialing across the DHS enterprise; and outline the projects needed to actualize a robust, cohesive environment across DHS programs.
While one size does not fit all, every program does not have to reinvent the wheel. The CFI aims to provide a consistent, security risk-based framework across all DHS credentials, improve credentialing processes to eliminate redundant activities, utilize existing information more effectively and improve the experience for individuals applying for DHS credentials. The guidance directs the following:
Design credentials to support multiple licenses, privileges, or status, based on the risks associated with the environments in which they will be used. Vetting, associated with like uses and like risks, should be the same. Immigration status determinations by DHS components should be verified electronically. Eligibility for a license, privilege, or status should be verified using technology. Design enrollment platforms and data collection investments so that they can be reused by other DHS programs – establishing a preference for “enroll once, use many” environment, where appropriate. Ensure opportunities for redress – individuals should be able to correct information held about them.
Integrating a Streamlined Transportation Screening Platform The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) entity is in the initial stages of an enterprise modernization that is being designed to meet the mission of TSA in line with the CFI requirements. The TTAC Enterprise Modernization Program supports TSA’s mission by significantly improving the vetting management and adjudication platform currently used for conducting security threat assessments on various transportation populations through the use of software applications and a common information technology infrastructure. The current TTAC vetting and credentialing enterprise architecture was created to support 2.5 million individuals per year. Today, the populations supported by TTAC have almost tripled.
It is anticipated that after five years, existing stove-piped business processes and information systems will either be reengineered or replaced by a new integrated business enterprise architecture that will: consolidate multiple enrollment methods, implement identity management services across programs, standardize the approach for customer relationship management, standardize the physical and virtual credentialing processes, standardize threat assessment processes, and consolidate operations, integrating program-specific IT systems and business processes into a common secure enterprise vetting and credentialing architecture. The TTAC Enterprise Modernization program presents an opportunity to eliminate redundant business practices, processes, and subsequent IT investments to achieve significant economies of scale benefits associated with a unifying business integration effort.
In line with the CFI, the TTAC Enterprise Modernization program provides for a unified, modular, and maintainable architecture that will reduce the cost, risk, and time associated with implementing new capabilities, on-boarding new populations, improving the robust nature of the architecture, and on-going operations and maintenance. The Department expects that TTAC modernization will support not only TSA needs but also other special population vetting programs that may support the security of critical infrastructure sectors. Further, TTAC modernization is being coordinated with the Department’s other ongoing information technology modernization efforts.
Biometric Screening and Identification In another effort to streamline DHS processes, DHS has designated US-VISIT’s Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) as the biometric storage and matching service for the Department, providing biometric identification and analysis services to agencies throughout the immigration and border management, law enforcement, and intelligence communities. US-VISIT supplies the technology for collecting and storing biometric data, provides analysis of the data to decision-makers, and ensures the integrity of the data.
IDENT plays an important role in the biometric screening and identity verification of non-U.S. citizens for ICE, CBP, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Coast Guard. US-VISIT also supports the Department of State’s (DOS) BioVisa Program and shares information with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Here is how it works:
With each encounter, US-VISIT checks a person’s biometrics against a watchlist of more than 5.2 million known or suspected terrorists, criminals, and immigration violators identified by U.S. authorities and Interpol. When an identification document is presented, a person’s biometrics are also checked against those DHS has on file as associated with the document to ensure that the document belongs to the person presenting it and not to someone else. US-VISIT provides the results of these checks to decision-makers when and where they need them.
Biometric Services for DHS and Other Agencies To give you an idea of the breadth of our services, every day US-VISIT provides access to biometric data for 30,000 authorized Federal, State, and local government agency users to help them identify, mitigate, and eliminate security risks. Let us give you a few examples.
USCIS uses biometrics to screen applicants for immigration benefits. Border Patrol and U.S. Coast Guard use biometrics as part of their efforts to apprehend illegal migrants. Department of Defense (DOD) and the intelligence community provide biometrics, including latent fingerprints, they collect from locations where terrorists have been, such as safe houses or training camps to DHS in order to determine whether we’ve previously encountered individuals they suspect to be terrorists and terror suspects. And finally, State, local and other federal agencies submit biometrics to DHS to support their investigations. Our Biometric Support Center (BSC) verifies almost 50,000 fingerprints each week—helping to solve crimes, identify John or Jane Does, and support terrorist investigations. Additionally, the US-VISIT Program Office is working with a number of other DHS components, such as the TSA, on future and planned credentialing and identity management programs.
10-Fingerprint Transition DHS’s transition from collecting 2 digital fingerprints to collecting 10 digital fingerprints at ports of entry from visitors to the United States is nearly complete. DHS deployed new 10-fingerprint scanners at U.S. POEs in 2008, providing the capability to capture 10 fingerprints from 97 percent of in-scope travelers. The transition to 10-fingerprint collection increases DHS’s ability to keep dangerous people out of the United States, while making legitimate travel more efficient. Today, the new fingerprint scanning devices are in place at all major POEs, so international visitors can expect to use the upgraded technology when they enter the United States.
The use of 10 fingerprints for biometric verification offers many enhancements. In 2007, DOS began collecting 10 fingerprints from visa applicants at all of our embassies and consulates to enhance the ability to establish and verify applicants’ identities. 10-fingerprint readers improve the accuracy of identification; improve interoperability with the FBI and DOS, local, and tribal governments; and will mean fewer travelers will be referred to CBP secondary inspection. DHS will now also be able to conduct full searches against the FBI Unsolved Latent File, which, for example, allows DHS to match against prints lifted from crime scenes and those collected in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Interoperability with the Departments of Justice and State DHS’s 10-fingerprint collection standard makes our system more compatible with the FBI’s biometric system, the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). We have been working with the FBI for the last several years to make our two databases fully interoperable to more seamlessly match biometric information so we can better identify people who pose a threat to our country.
DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and DOS signed a memorandum of understanding on interoperability on August 1, 2008. The first-phase capabilities for the initial operational capability were deployed in October 2008.
This integrated system will allow authorized users access to all relevant information in a timely manner so they can make the right decisions about the individuals they encounter. IDENT/IAFIS interoperability increases the ability of DHS and DOS to screen individuals; and it benefits the FBI and other law enforcement organizations by providing them with increased access to immigration information about high-risk individuals to whom DOS has refused visas and those whom DHS has expeditiously removed.
Secure Communities The Department’s Secure Communities initiative will change immigration enforcement by using technology to automate sharing with law enforcement agencies and by applying risk-based methodologies to focus resources on assisting all local communities to remove high-risk criminal aliens.
In 2008, DHS and DOJ began an information-sharing program with local law enforcement counties in North Carolina by providing them access to immigration violation information on their criminal arrests. This capability is part of DHS and DOJ efforts to distribute integration technology that will link local law enforcement agencies to both FBI and DHS biometric databases.
US-VISIT and the FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division continue to work with ICE in preparation for further deployment of Secure Communities.
Developing Interoperability with the Department of Defense DHS and DOD have begun identifying ways the two departments can exchange information in a more systematic manner to further each other’s missions consistent with legal authorities and privacy. Central to this effort is an automated exchange of biometric data on individuals’ DOD encounters overseas. Such information would greatly enhance the ability of DOS and DHS to effectively screen who is admitted into the United States. DHS information is useful to DOD for credentialing and access control vetting, among other uses. As with interoperability with DOJ and DOS, some of the most complex issues concerning data sharing are not technical, but rather those dealing with policy and business processes. DHS and DOD are working diligently to explore potential opportunities and to identify technical and process solutions.
Air/Sea Biometric Exit DHS has performed significant planning and testing over the past three years examining possible solutions for integrating US-VISIT biometric exit requirements into the international air departure process. The options of deployment at airline ticket counters, TSA checkpoints, airline boarding gates, and in airport terminals are being considered. For more than two years, US-VISIT ran biometric exit pilots at 14 air and sea locations. These pilots evaluated the use of both automated kiosks and mobile devices in port terminals. The pilots ended in May 2007 and demonstrated that the technology works, but also that compliance by travelers was low.
On April 24, 2008, DHS published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on the collection of biometrics from aliens departing from air and sea ports. The NPRM proposed that commercial air carriers and vessel carriers collect and transmit international visitors’ biometric information to DHS within 24 hours of their departure from the United States. Development and publication of a final rule is pending the completion of pilots as required by the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (Pub. Law 110-329). The 2009 Appropriations Act restricts US-VISIT from spending any money to create an air exit solution, until the pilots are completed and a report on the pilot test is submitted to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and reviewed by GAO. DHS is assessing methods for conducting air exit pilots consistent with the FY 2009 appropriation. The results of the pilot evaluation, combined with the review of public comments submitted in response to the NPRM, will inform the decision on the option to be selected for publication in the final rule.
When a long-term exit solution is deployed, it will also be deployed to commercial seaports to provide an integrated biometric exit capture for vessel carriers passengers. However, the scope for biometric exit at sea will be considerably smaller than for air.
International Cooperation and Collaboration When DHS began the US-VISIT program to collect biometrics as part of port of entry screening, the world watched skeptically to see if the benefits of biometrics would work on a large scale. Although a handful of nations were testing biometrics, DHS was the first to launch a comprehensive biometric-based identity management system for immigration and border management. Five years later, more and more countries are approaching us to discuss our lessons learned as they develop their own similar systems. We want other countries to benefit from our experience, and in turn, we can learn from them.
Some countries have already begun operations or are nearing deployment. For example:
In November 2007, Japan implemented a two-fingerprint biometric entry system that is similar to US-VISIT’s initial implementation. The United Kingdom is collecting 10 fingerprints from visa applicants and is testing fingerprint collection at ports of entry. The European Union is building a 10-fingerprint visa-issuance program based on the very successful Eurodac. We are working closely with Australia, which has been a pioneer in facial recognition, as it advances its identity management program. The United Arab Emirates has been using iris scans as part of its immigration and border control processes for some time now. Other countries are actively pursuing biometrics:
In August 2008, Peru announced it is working to implement biometric technology in its migration control systems to guarantee the authenticity of personal identification documents and to speed visitor control. Mexico is planning to modify its currently successful biographic-based system to incorporate biometrics, which is similar to what we did in 2004. Canada recently approved the budget for a 10-fingerprint visa-issuance program. As the use of biometrics increases worldwide, the importance of international standards and best practices cannot be overstated. Consistent international standards for biometrics are essential to developing compatible systems, and compatible systems are essential to crippling international criminal enterprises as well as terrorists’ ability to travel. Appropriate data sharing can only be accomplished with consistent standards.
The Future of Biometric Screening Biometrics offer real opportunities to dramatically increase the efficiency of identifying people. The Department is researching emerging technologies to expand our screening and identification capabilities. We recognize that future identity management systems will require increased assurance, efficiency, ease of use, and flexibility.
As DHS implements biometric exit procedures, both at airports and land border POEs, we are looking for more efficient, less invasive technologies to verify visitors’ departures. Particularly at the land border, we are looking for technologies that might meet our needs better than requiring visitors to have their fingerprints scanned while driving at speed through a POE.
In some cases, the key to expanding biometric screening is to bring the technology to remote locations where decision-makers need it.
For example, Coast Guard is using mobile biometric collection and analysis capabilities on the high seas off the coasts of Puerto Rico and Florida. This project has helped the Coast Guard identify and refer for prosecution and/or administrative immigration proceedings hundreds of repeat illegal migrants who are ineligible to enter the United States, including some wanted for human smuggling and murder. In addition, CBP’s Air and Marine Operations is examining opportunities to use mobile biometrics to its areas of operation.
Success Stories Our biometric entry procedures have made a tremendous difference in efforts to improve the integrity of our immigration and border management system. Some of our many success stories include stopping more than 2,400 criminals or immigration violators at the POEs based on biometrics alone, and identifying thousands who are ineligible to receive visas to travel to the United States. There is no doubt that we have deterred countless more.
DHS’s use of biometrics is helping eliminate the ability to use fraudulent or altered travel documents. Now when travelers arrive in the United States, we are able to quickly verify their identity and identify those who are known to have committed immigration violations. Here is an example:
On March 16, 2008, a subject arrived at the John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York and applied for admission with a valid Turkish passport and an unexpired B1/B2 visa. The subject was referred to secondary inspection as a match to the IDENT biometric watchlist for a previous voluntary departure. During secondary inspection, queries revealed that on November 10, 2003, the subject had been apprehended taking pictures of the Ft. Leonard Wood Missouri Military Base. While in custody, it was discovered then that he had overstayed his period of admission in the United States. This subject had been admitted into the United States on June 9, 1997, and was granted voluntary departure by an immigration judge on May 13, 2005, to remove himself by September 13, 2005. On March 16, 2008, the subject attempted to enter the United States using the identity of his twin brother through his brother’s travel documents. The subject was denied access. The subject is inadmissible to the United States for willful misrepresentation and not being in possession of valid travel documents. Biometrics are helping enforce our borders away from ports of entry, too.
In December 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted 10 migrants attempting to illegally enter Puerto Rico by sea. When the migrants’ biometrics were checked against IDENT, it was revealed that two of the migrants had illegally entered the United States before, had been subsequently removed from the United States, and were suspected of being part of a human trafficking organization. The two suspected traffickers were brought ashore for referral for prosecution along with two witnesses who would testify against them. Since the Coast Guard began using mobile biometric services to identify illegal migrants at sea, prosecutions of repeat offenders have increased dramatically and illegal migration has dropped by 60 percent in the area where the technology is being used.
US-VISIT Privacy DHS is committed to adhering to the strictest privacy standards. DHS only collects information needed to achieve the program objectives and mission and only uses this information in a manner consistent with the purpose for which it was collected. DHS also conducts periodic audits of its systems to ensure appropriate use within the limitations of the Privacy Act.
Ultimately, the success of the US-VISIT program will be measured by not only our ability to identify those who may present a threat, but also our ability to protect against identity theft and fraud. We are acutely aware that our success depends on how well we are able to protect the privacy of those whose biometrics we hold. A breach of this most personal data would undermine the public’s trust. We have a dedicated privacy officer responsible for ensuring compliance with privacy laws and procedures and for creating a culture of privacy protection within the US-VISIT Program. Furthermore, we are transparent. From the beginning, we made clear that the information gathered by DHS or State will be used only for the purposes for which it was collected, consistent with those uses authorized or mandated by law. Our policy extends to non-U.S. citizens most of the same privacy protections we give by law to U.S. citizens. We regularly publish privacy impact assessments and system of records notices to provide people with a clear view of the information we collect, how we store it, and our policies and practices to ensure it is not abused.
Conclusion To ensure we can shut down terrorist networks before they ever get to the United States, we must also take the lead in driving international biometric standards. By developing compatible systems, we will be able to securely share terrorist information internationally to bolster our defenses. Just as we are improving the way we collaborate within the U.S. Government to identify and weed out terrorists and other dangerous people, we have the same obligation to work with our partners abroad to prevent terrorists from making any move undetected. Biometrics provide a new way to bring terrorists’ true identities to light, stripping them of their greatest advantage—remaining unknown.
Biometrics have increased our Nation’s security and the security of nations around the world to a level that simply did not exist before. Biometrics are affording us greater efficiencies, making travel more convenient, predictable, and secure for legitimate travelers. Biometrics are enabling people to have greater confidence that their identities are protected, and in turn decision-makers are more certain that the people they encounter are who they say they are.
So what is next? We need to aggressively pursue innovation. Those who want to do us harm continue to contemplate ways to exploit our weaknesses, so we cannot afford to slow down. We too must contemplate ways to create even more efficient and affordable identification technologies. We have to continue to explore mobile biometrics and biometrics captured at speed, and we must do so safely.
We must also continue to advocate abroad. We recognize that with the power of biometrics and a foundation of international cooperation, we can transform and enhance the way the people travel the world and the way we protect our nations from those who would do us harm.
Chairman Price, Ranking Member Rogers, and other distinguished Members, we have outlined our current efforts that, with your assistance, will help DHS continue to protect America. The Department’s use of biometrics plays a critical role in supporting many programs and initiatives within DHS and other Federal agencies.
Thank you for again for this opportunity to testify. We will be happy to answer any of your questions. “
Monahul Filotheu de la Manastirea Petru Voda, cibernetician, explica in prima zi de dupa Duminica Iertarii care sunt victoriile Bisericii Nationale in lupta contra insemnarii biometrice si defineste urmatorul obiectiv: atingerea si depasirea unui numar de 500.000 de semnaturi pentru a se putea introduce o initiativa legislativa impotriva cipurilor din actele biometrice, prevazute pentru Pasapoarte, Permise Auto si, din 2011, Carti de Identitate, conform planului sistemului totalitar de control si supraveghere a omenirii. In prezent sunt 20.000 de semnaturi online, la adresa https://www.petitiononline.com/NU666/petition.html si peste 100.000 olografe. In continuare acestea pot fi trimise la Manastirea Petru Voda, Comuna Poiana Teiului, Judetul Neamt. Detalii, in curand, lawww.petruvoda.ro.
Belgian Biometric Passport does not get a pass… Your personal data are in danger!
Gildas Avoine, Kassem Kalach, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater
UCL Crypto Group, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
A research team in cryptography from the Catholic University of Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve) disclosed serious weaknesses in the Belgian biometric passport, the only type of passport distributed in Belgium since the end of 2004. The work carried out in Louvain-la-Neuve during the course of May 2007 show that Belgian passports issued between end 2004 and July 2006 do not include any security mechanism to protect the personal data embedded in the passport’s microchip. Passports issued after July 2006 do benefit from security mechanisms but these ones are flawed. This means that anyone possessing a little electronic reading device, which is easy and cheap to acquire, can steal the passport content while it is still in the pocket of the victim owners and thus without their knowing. Face and signature are among the data at risk. This news is all the more surprising because Karel De Gucht, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared in the Parliament on 9th January 2007 that the Belgian passport benefited from the security mechanisms advocated by the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Biometric passports appeared in Belgium around the end of 2004, putting the country among the forerunners in the field. Those passports can be recognized by the logo on their front cover. They possess a microchip (located in the back cover of the document) that embeds personal data on the owner: face, signature, name, first name, passport number, sex, date and place of birth, issue place, issuing authority, issue and expiry dates. The chip can be remotely queried (the communication range is about 10 cm with a reader available to the public) while the standard issued by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) includes the use of cryptographic means to prevent unauthorized remote access to this information. In accordance with the standard, the two coded lines (Machine Readable Zone) at the bottom of the first page of the passport have to be read in order to get access to the content of the chip. The aim is to prevent the personal data from being read by anyone who does not have the passport in his hands. However, Gildas Avoine, Kassem Kalach, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater (who leads the Crypto Group at UCL) have discovered that Belgian passports of first generation (the ones issued until July 2006 and thus valid until 2011) do not possess any security mechanism to ensure the protection of personal data. They demonstrated that it is possible to read the content of a first generation passport at a distance and in a few seconds without the owner’s notice. Not only do these passports not respect the recommendations from the ICAO but they contain non required information as the signature of the owner. The theft of this information opens the way to numerous malicious deeds.
This discovery is all the more surprising because Karel De Gucht, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared in the Parliament on 9th January 2007, after having been interpellated by MPs Joseph Arens and Jean-Claude Maene: “(…) the data embedded in the chip [of the Belgian passport] are protected by two security means: Basic Access Control and Active Authentication”. Unfortunately, only since July 2006, has the Belgian passport benefitted from the Basic Access Control (BAC), mechanism that allows protecting personal data. UCL researchers have thus studied these second generation passports and discovered that the latter also suffers from a very serious weakness, allowing anyone to read it at a distance without having received authorization. The weakness has already been revealed for English, Dutch, German and Swiss passports but the Belgian one is more sensitive than the others. In accordance with the ICAO standard, you just need to read the two coded lines at the bottom of the first page of the passport to get access to the content of the microchip. In fact, the only data considered in those lines are the date of birth, of expiry, and the passport number. It is then possible to “guess” this information with an exhaustive search on all the possible combinations of birth date/expiry date/passport number. The Belgian passport is less resistant to this attack than the other passports because the passport numbers are given in increasing order at the manufacture and are linked to the reference language of the passport. Moreover, the validity is only 5 years. All those elements reduce the scope of possible combinations. After having read first generation passports in a few seconds, UCL researchers managed to read any second generation passport in an hour if the date of birth and the date of expiry are known. Further to their works, G. Avoine, K. Kalach and J.-J. Quisquater consider that Belgian biometric passports of first generation must be taken out of circulation without further delay. They also encourage the Belgian government and the European Commission to require that the ICAO modifies the standard. An easy way to fix this weakness without significantly changing the standard consists in adding random characters to the two coded lines. The researchers underline that the Belgian passport could also follow the example of the American passport and insert in its cover a radio-blocking shield (Faraday cage) that will prevent electronic reading of the passport while it is closed.
Technical Description Introduction to Electronic Passport Electronic Passport (ePassport) was used for the first time in Malaysia in 1998, thus pre-dating the ICAO standard [1]. Belgium was one of the first countries in the world to issue ePassport compliant to this standard. Nowadays, many other countries issue ePassport for example France, Germany, Nederlands, USA. The wide and fast deployment of ePassport has mainly been possible thanks to the ICAO efforts. ePassport specifications were drawn up on the basis of a detailed study over several years carried out by the ICAO since 1998. In addition the USA-VISIT program has considerably accelerated this wide spread. “The latest legislation (16/06/05) passed by US Congress states that VWP (Visa Waiver Program) countries are required to have a biometric passport issuing system in place by 26 October 2006 in order to continue as members of the program” [2]. The fundamental motivation of implementing electronic passport is to provide more secure passports through an electronic micro-chip embedded in its book. This chip allows ensuring data integrity, i.e. nobody can modify the content of a passport without being detected; this integrity is ensured by the issuing authority digital signature. Data authenticity is also protected: fabricating a passport from scratch is not possible because a counterfeiter can not create himself the signature in question. Besides, the electronic chip allows incorporating biometrics to bind a passport to its authentic citizenship, thus adding additional identification features. Due its physical and electrical properties, the chip is a very secure storage of biographical and biometric information (name, date-of-birth, passport number, facial image,…), that can be compared to those visually disclosed on the passport’s first page and with biometrics of the physical person. Finally, the chip may prevent cloning or substitution through a mechanism in which the chip has to prove the possession of a public-key-based private key generated in highly secure way by the issuing state. An electronic passport (also called biometric passport) is the same as a traditional passport combined with a small integrated circuit (chip) embedded in the book. Belgian passports incorporate this chip in the back cover. The ICAO defines the biometric identification as a verification of human identity through the measurement of distinguishing physiological or behavioural characteristics. The ICAO only considers three types of biometrics: facial recognition, fingerprint and iris scan. Only facial recognition is mandatory. According to the ICAO, the chip will store as a minimum the data contained on the first page of the passport and a digital image of the passport’s holder. The chip may also contain optional information such as handwritten signatures, finger print, address, phone number, and may indicate information about other people namely the person to notify in case of emergency. (for more details see the Logical Data Structure [3] of the passport). A contact-less technology (usually called RFID, short for Radio-Frequency Identification) has been chosen due to its numerous advantages compared with contact-based identification systems. Incorporating the IC into the passport book is much easier. Contact-based readers are expensive to maintain and prone to malfunction. This technology has been proven in other fields and provides high level of convenience. In the future the electronic passport may be used for automatic identity verification, self-identification, thus making the immigration inspections faster and the traveler’s journey more comfortable. However, with the absence of some cryptographic measures, this handy wireless property makes many security concerns arise in the context of electronic passport. Using a simple commercial reader, one can read all the electronic information stored in the passport. Still worse, this technology provides a way to know the presence of a passport’s bearer at some place and at a specific time, thus raising the traceably problem. Consequently, the ICAO has specified [1] amongst others many requirements and recommendations to countermeasure these issues in particular a Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging mechanism. In this research we study the security of the Belgian electronic passport that has been deployed conforming to the ICAO standard since the end of October 2004. Before describing our attack, we will present a brief introduction to the RFID technology used in this new application, and then detail the security mechanisms required or recommended by the ICAO. RFID technology
Formally, Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) is an automatic identification technology relying on wireless communication, using special devices called tags. Any RFID system essentially consists of two main components: tags (transponders) and readers (transceivers). The computational capabilities of tags depend on the target application. Tags may be a simple memory between 32 and 128 bits (tracking products and animals) up to a chip containing a microprocessor. In the case of electronic passport, the data storage capacity of the IC is a minimum of 32 KB, as specified by the ICAO, . Inin order to store the mandatory facial image and duplication of the MRZ data. States planning to store additional information must provide memories of much large capacity (70 KB). Besides, the passport chip contains a microprocessor in order to be able to accomplish complex cryptographic computations. As recommended by the ICAO the Belgian passport, for example, implements 3DES, SHA-1, and RSA. High-cost RFID tag is sometimes called contact-less chip or smart card instead, as in the case of electronic passport. As for RFID readers they vary a lot according to the target application. Nowadays, passport readers are mainly available in governmental inspection systems on borders and airports. In the future, they may be found in airelines compagnies and hotels. The electronic chip required by the ICAO must conform to ISO/IEC 14443 A/B, already adopted in other applications (smart cards); Belgian passport uses ISO/IEC 14443 A. One interesting property of this standard is that its maximum reading range is less than 10 cm. In fact, many researchers claim to be able to read a passport from a larger distance. In our attack we used a low-cost commercial reader without trying to go that direction.
Precizare a Biroului de Presă al Patriarhiei Române în legătură cu problema paşapoartelor biometrice În legătură cu opiniile exprimate în dezbateri publice şi pe diferite site-uri referitoare la problema paşapoartelor biometrice, precizăm următoarele: Biserica Ortodoxă Română nu aprobă iniţiative particulare şi de grup, fără consultarea şi binecuvântarea ierarhului locului, care provoacă mai mult tulburare, decât să clarifice problema. În vederea formulării unui punct de vedere oficial în cadrul şedinţei Sfântului Sinod din zilele de 25-26 februarie 2009, Patriarhia Română a solicitat Direcţiei Paşapoarte din cadrul Ministerului Administraţiei şi Internelor lămuriri privitoare la paşapoartele biometrice şi în ce măsură datele cuprinse în acestea nu aduc atingere libertăţii şi demnităţii persoanelor umane.
Cipurile RFID, introduse in actele de identitate ale romanilor fara nici o dezbatere publica, comporta riscuri care ar trebui sa intre in atentia Ministerului Sanatatii si a cadrelor medicale din Romania. Iata: REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS* CEJA Report 5-A-07
Subject: Radio Frequency ID Devices in Humans Presented by: Robert M. Sade, MD, Chair Referred to: Reference Committee on Amendments to Constitution and Bylaws (Richert E. Quinn, Jr., MD, Chair)
INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are computer chips connected to miniature antennae that can be used to transmit information electronically via a proximate RFID reader. The use of these devices in health care represents another promising development in information technology, but also raises important ethical, legal and social issues. Specifically, the use of RFID labeling in humans for medical purposes may improve patient safety, but also may pose some physical risks, compromise patient privacy, or present other social hazards.
This report responds to Resolution 6 (A-06), “RFID Labeling in Humans,” which called for study of the medical and ethical implications of RFID chips in humans. This report focuses on ethical issues in the use of RFID chips, specifically in regard to their implantation for clinical purposes.
BACKGROUND
Radio frequency identification devices utilize wireless technology to communicate data via signals in the radio frequency range of the electromagnetic spectrum. Data are stored in a microchip attached to an antenna, and packaged so that they can be attached to or embedded in products, animals, or people.
The two main types of RFID tags are passive and active. Passive tags contain no internal power supply. They convert the radio frequency energy emitted from a reader device into signals that transmit stored data for a distance of a few feet. These passive devices currently have restricted amounts of data storage and are of limited functionality, because the information they contain cannot be modified.
In comparison, active RFID tags contain an internal battery, which provides increased reliability, longer transmission ranges, on-tag data processing and greater data storage.[1] While their capacity to process data internally allows for expanded capabilities in the future, their greater transmission range presents a more substantial threat to data confidentiality and patients’ privacy. In October 2004, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first RFID tags specifically intended for human implantation.[2] Approved RFID devices are currently limited to passive units, intended for identifying patients. Active RFID chips may be approved in the future.
Human-implanted passive RFID devices that identify patients may also contain essential biometric and medical information. The tags are primarily intended for patients with chronic diseases, such as coronary artery disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes mellitus, stroke or seizure disorder, or are implanted into patients with medical devices such as pacemakers, stents, or joint replacements. These devices are approximately the size of a grain of rice, and are implanted under the skin via a hypodermic-type needle in less than one minute.[3]
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
RFID tags may promote the timely identification of patients and expedite access to their medical information. As a result, these devices can improve the continuity and coordination of care with resulting reduction in adverse drug events and other medical errors.[4]
RFID tags also may improve efficiency within the health care system. In conjunction with improved medical record management, these devices may facilitate access to patient records, medication lists, and diagnostic tests.[5] To be maximally effective, however, the information in these devices must be adequately integrated into present clinical information and communications systems, laboratory databases, and pharmacy systems.1
Appropriate processes also must be developed to inscribe, read and archive data stored on RFID tags. As new designs enter the marketplace, the emergence of competing standards may present problems for hospital staff if a patient’s ID tag proves incompatible with the interrogation devices employed by the hospital.1
Physical risks to patients
These devices may present physical risks to the patient. Though they are removable, their small size allows them to migrate under the skin, making them potentially difficult to extract. However, this tendency may be minimized by constructing RFID tags from materials that permit surrounding tissue to encase the device. In addition, RFID tags may cause electromagnetic interference, which may interfere with electrosurgical devices and defibrillators.1 Finally, it has not been determined whether RFID tags might affect the efficacy of pharmaceuticals.1,[6]
PATIENT PRIVACY AND SECURITY
The primary concerns surrounding human RFID labeling pertain to their potential impact on patient privacy and security. Physicians must assure patients that their medical information will be held in confidence (see Opinion E-5.05, “Confidentiality”). Moreover, maintenance of privacy is required to protect patients from embarrassment, potential social discrimination, loss of health care coverage, or other detrimental consequences (see Opinion E-5.059, “Privacy in the Context of Health Care”).
At this time, the security of RFID devices has not been fully established. Physicians, therefore, cannot assure patients that the personal information contained on RFID tags will be appropriately protected. In light of these security concerns, the FDA currently requires RFID transponders to store only a unique electronic identification code to be read by the scanner.2 This identification code can then be used to access patient identity and corresponding health information stored in a database.
To protect confidentiality and privacy, the medical community should advocate for the adoption of other protections, such as computer encryption or digital signatures. Ultimately, the medical community should undertake appropriate efforts to prevent unauthorized access to patients’ information contained on RFID tags (see also E-5.07, “Confidentiality: Computers,” AMA Policy Database).
INFORMED CONSENT
To properly respect patient autonomy, RFID tags should not be implanted or removed without the prior consent of patients or their surrogates (see E-8.08, “Informed Consent,” and E-8.081, “Surrogate Decision Making”). During the consent process, decision-makers should be informed of the potential risks and benefits associated with RFID tags, including the many uncertainties regarding their efficacy. Patients are also entitled to know who will be granted access to the data contained on RFID tags and the purposes for which this information will be used.[7]
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
It seems likely that utilization of RFID devices for medical purposes will expand.4 The medical profession must continue to monitor the efficacy of these devices. If RFID tags are proven to benefit patient care significantly, the profession should advocate for widespread adoption of RFID technology, and for policies that make RFID tags available to all patients who would benefit (see Opinion E-2.095, “The Provision of Adequate Health Care”).
However, if objective evidence demonstrates negative consequences that outweigh the benefits in relation to health care, the medical profession will bear an important responsibility to oppose the use of RFID labeling in humans.
Finally, physicians should be aware of emerging non-medical applications of human-implantable RFID devices. For instance, active RFID technologies might be considered for the tracking or surveillance of individuals who pose a threat to others. Although this is only one of many possible uses of RFID technology in the future, it alerts the medical profession to the need for continuous assessment of the appropriate role of physicians participating in RFID labeling of human beings. Indeed, certain uses could constitute an infringement upon patients’ individual liberties, placing physicians in a position to act as patient advocates by promoting the use of other, less intrusive alternatives, when available.4
CONCLUSION
RFID technology has the potential to improve patient care as well as patient safety. However, the safety and efficacy of human-implantable RFID devices has yet to be established. Therefore, the medical community should support further investigations to obtain the data necessary to make informed medical decisions regarding the use of these devices. The medical community should also be sensitive to potential social consequences of RFID devices, such as non-medical applications in law enforcement.
RECOMMENDATION
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs recommends that the following be adopted and the remainder of the report be filed.
Radio frequency identification (RFID) devices may help to identify patients, thereby improving the safety and efficiency of patient care, and may be used to enable secure access to patient clinical information. However, their efficacy and security have not been established. Therefore, physicians implanting such devices should take certain precautions:
(1) The informed consent process must include disclosure of medical uncertainties associated with these devices.
(2) Physicians should strive to protect patients’ privacy by storing confidential information only on RFID devices with informational security similar to that required of medical records.
(3) Physicians should support research into the safety, efficacy, and potential non-medical uses of RFID devices in human beings.
(NEW HOD/CEJA Policy) Fiscal Note: Staff cost estimated at less than $500 to implement. * Reports of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs are assigned to the reference committee on Constitution and Bylaws. They may be adopted, not adopted, or referred. A report may not be amended, except to clarify the meaning of the report and only with the concurrence of the Council. [1] Ingeholm; Mun, K; Mun, SK. RFID in Healthcare: The Applications, and Obstacles, Are Many; Journal of AHIMA; 2006. 77(8): 56-62. [2] US Food and Drug Administration. Medical devices; general hospital and personal use devices; classification of implantable radiofrequency trasnsponder system for patient information and health information. Federal Register. 2004; 69(237): 71702-4. [3] DeNoon D. Chip implants: Better care or pricacy scare. 2005. Accessible at” https://www.webmd.com/content/Article/109/109216.htm [4] Wicks, AM; Visich, JK; Li, Suhong. Radio Frequency Identification Applications in Hospital Environments; Hospital Topics.2006; 84(3): 3-8. [5] VeriMed™ Information Center for Patients; https://www.verimedinfo.com/content/intro/physicians [6] Wasserman, Elizabeth. A Prescription for Pharmaceuticals; RFID Journal. 2006. Accessible at: https://www.rfidjournal.com/magazine/article/1739/1/173/ [7] Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission, Ethical Aspects of ICT Implants in the Human Body. 2005. Descarca aici: https://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/467/ceja5a07.doc
Am urmarit si eu “postfactum ” secventele video cu privire la DEZBATEREA publica care a fost organizata de AZEC asupra pasapoartelor electronice de identitate, si am observat ca s-au OMIS a fi macar ”atinse” tangential cateva lucruri deosebit de importante si serioase cu privire la impactul si implicatiile negative in plan social a acestor noi documented identitate : Lucrurile care consider ca s-au omis, le punctez mai jos, si le apreciez ca niste pareri personale, pe care le fac ca un crestin orthodox si ca un cetatean roman pe seama celor dicutate: 1. Nu s-a discutat nimic (sau aproape) nimic despre NOILE PERMISE ELECTRONICE DE CONDUCERE A AUTOVEHICULELOR, discutia concentrandu-se exclusiv pe analizarea si comentarea “pasapoartelor” electronice. 2. S-a omis a se RELIEFA si INVEDERA de catre vorbitorii care au fost invitati a lua cuvantul (inclusive de catre Avocatul Cezar AXINTE), un ASPECT deosebit al consecintelor negative ale implementarii in masa a noilor documente de identitate cu cip electronic si anume: – Daca cipul contine O ANTENA asa cum a explicat reprezentantul Ministerului de Interne, care a dat toate lamuririle “tehnice” publicului participant la aceasta dezbatere, INSEMNA, ca pasaportul/permisul auto, POATE RECEPTA si RESPECTIV EMITE SEMNALE. – Daca cipul poate nu numai…recpeta semnale (radio sau de alta natura), ci daca poate si EMITE semnale (pe frecventa de unde radio asa cum explica comisarul de la Directia de Pasapoarte), insemna logic ca aceste semnale POT fi la randul lor REPERATE si RECEPTATE (si “INTERCEPTATE”) si “LOCALIZATE” de anumite “statii electronice – receptoare” sau “aparate eletronice-receptoare” dotate cu ANTENE PUTERNICE si care sunt amplasate (cu precadere de catre marile armate lumii, dar si de catre institutii/companii civile care activeaza in domeniul telecomunicatiilor si care folosesc aparatura electronica de ultima generatie, pentru interceptarea unor astfel de semnale) in mediul terestru, subacvatic, in atmosfera sau in cosmos… – Cu totii stim ca SATELITII si alte aparate electronice, dar cu deosebire SATELITII, atat cei militari, cat si ceilalti, POT REPERA si RECEPTA DE LA MARE DISTANTA, cu o mare marja de PRECIZIE SPATIALA astfel de “semnale”. (ne aducem aminte ca unul din capii armatei cecene a fost “lichidat in trecut de armata rusa, tocmai pentru ca satelitii militari rusesti i-au interceptat si LOCALIZAT POZITIA spatial si geografica unde se afla, dupa semnalul “telefonului mobil” de la care acesta vorbea cu oamenii sai…”) – Prin urmare daca cipul documetelor de identitate electronice poate fi reperat/receptat/interceptat de catre SATELITI sau de alte ECHIPAMENTE TEHNICE de la…distanta, datorita semnalelor pe care le emite, atunci inseamna ca persoana posesoare a acestor documente electronice de identitate care contin aceste cipuri emitatoare de semnale, POATE FI LOCALIZATA IN SPATIU si TIMP in orice moment! – Iar daca o persoana – cetatean roman, posesoare a unor astfel de docmente de identitate electronice, poate fi LOCALIZATA in orice moment prin SATELIT (fie ca se deplaseaza cu masina, fie ca merge pe jos, fie ca se deplaseaza in tara sa, fie ca se deplaseaza in strainatate), atunci inseamna ca ea NU MAI CALATORESTE LIBER, asa cum afirma cu nonsalanta la dezbatere celalalt comisar care a luat in maini pasaportul electronic si care l-a descris in fata publicului. – Iar daca o persoana POATE FI “observata” si “urmarita” si “monitorizata” virtual si on line, si NON STOP, oriunde s-ar afla si in orice moment, atunci insemna ca UN MARE si IMPORTANT DREPT al sau si O MARE LIBETRTATE CIVILA a sa, care este prevazuta si stipulata si garantata atat de catre Constitutia Romaniei, cat si de catre alte Documente Internationale de Drept, Europene sau ale ONU, sunt INCALCATE in MOD ABUZIV de catre statul roman, dar si de catre autoritatile UE. Si anume : – Art. 25 din Constitutia Romaniei, – Art.18, alin.1 din Tratatul de Instituire a Uniunii Europene; – Art. II – 66, din Partea a II – a Tratatului de Instituire a unei Constitutii pentru Europa; – Art.13 din DECLARATIA UNIVERSALA A DREPTURILOR OMULUI, adoptata de Adunarea Generala a ONU la 10.dec.1948 ; – Art.9 si mai ales Art.12 din PACTUL INTERNATIONAL CU PRIVIRE LA DREPTURILE CIVILE SI POLITICE, adoptat de ONU, la 16.dec. 1966; – Art.5, alin.1 din CONVENTIA PENTRU APARAREA DREPTURILOR OMULUI si a LIBERTATILOR FUNDAMENTALE (adoptata de Consiliul Europei, la Roma la 4. nov. 1950, si “amendata prin alte protocoale ulterioare”); In stransa legatura cu acest articol se afla si Art.10, alin.1, teza I, care este in contradictie vadita ca NOUA lege 298 a monotorizarii mijloacelor de comunicare, adoptata de curand de legiuitorul roman! Iata asadar ca aceast ASPECT al implicatiilor si consecintelor deosebit de grave din punct de vedere al LIBERTATII DE CIRCULATIE a cetatenilor romani A FOST TOTAL NEOBSERVAT si NEDISCUTAT…public de catre reprezentantii AZEC-ului si invitatii sai! In alte cuvinte spus, DISCUTIA si DEZBATEREA organizata de AZEC a “gravitat” si s-a “axat” aproape exclusiv in jurul SEMNIFICATIEI “spirituale” si morale a cipului si a influentei sale negative asupra vietii (cu deosebire duhovnicesti) a crestinului, si asupra MANTURII SALE. Si s-au NEGLIJAT complet de catre vorbitorii care au luat cuvantul la dezbatere, IMPLICATIILE si CONSECINTELE periculoase majore NEDEMOCRATICE asupra DIMENSIUNII CIVICE a LIBERTATILOR si DREPTURILOR CIVILE fundamentale ale cetatenilor romani care sunt afectate negativ prin impementarea pe scara larga a acestor documente electronice! In alte cuvinte spus…nimeni din cei prezenti la dezbatere NU A VORBIT si nu a atins macar in treacat si tangential IDEEA fundamentala privitoare la faptul ca UNELE DREPTURI SI LIBERTATI CIVILE deosebit de IMPORTANTE ale cetatenilor romani au fost ”CIUNTITE” si la urma urmei…“PRIPONITE” serios (precum sunt “priponite vitele cu o funie mai lunga sau mai scurta la un tarus…sau cum sunt legate cu o sforicica pasarile zburatoare de picior…) prin noile acte normative care oficializeaza si reglemenmteaza implementarea In randul populatiei romanesti a noilor documete electronice de identitate, iar romanii au fost mintiti de guvernanti ca au ramas…totusi “pe deplin liberi, cand in retaliate au fost PRIPONITI ca…vitele de TARUSUL CIPULUI ELECTRONIC!! Este important A NU FI TRECUTE CU VEDEREA (prea usor si prea repede) aceste ASPECTE deosebit de importante ale implicatiilor sociale negative ale noilor documente de identitate asupra LIBERTATILOR CIVILE ale cetatenillor romani, care aspect au ramas NEABORDATE si NEDEZBATUTE si NECLARIFICATE la dezbaterea organizata de AZEC pe 22.ianuarie, pentru ca pe viitor toate aceste lucuri SA FIE REABORDATE si CLARIFICATE. Foarte bine ar fi daca aceste aspect pe care le-am invederat mai sus SI CARE AU FOST OMISE a fi dicutate la dezbaterea din 22.ian, sa fie AVUTE IN VEDERE atat de catre PATRIRAHIA B.O.R, care va trebui sa raspunda la Scrisoarea care I s-a adresat la sfarsitul dezbaterii organizate de AZEC, cat si de catre juristii romani care vor trebui sa PLEDEZE in viitor in fata CURTILOR DE JUSTITIE romanesti sau europene, in procesele in care se va sustine EXECEPTIA DE NECONSTITUTIONALITATE atat a actelor normative care reglementeaza noile documente electronice de identitate, cat si a LEGII NR. 298/2008, de care s- a facut atata caz in blogosfera romaneasca si in media romaneasca! In final, pentru a nu fi inteles gresit asupra celor spuse de mine pana acum, doresc sa fac o ultima remarca, si anume ca prin cele pe care le-am invederat in aceste randuri nu am dorit sa subliniez ca semnificatia duhovniceasca si morala si teologica pe care unii crestini ortodocsi o dau cipului nu ar fi importanta si ca in primul rand ar trebui sa “PRIMEZE” semnificatia CIVICA si JURIDICA a rolului si impactului social major…negative a acestor documente, ci doresc sa subliniez doar faptul ca acesta din urma INTERPRETARE si semnificatie nu a fost deloc SURPRINSA si TRATATA si PUNCTATA in timpul dezbaterilor, omiterea ei, lasand loc unor discutii si dezbateri viitoare…OBLIGATORII…! AMIN! Doamne ajuta! “
April 12th, 2009 
VR 
Microcipurile din pastile le-ar putea permite in curand doctorilor sa afle daca pacientii lor au luat medicamentele prescrise. Senzorii digerabili, de doar un milimetru, ii vor ajuta pe medici si chirurgi sa-si monitorizeze pacientii in afara spitalelor si a salilor de operatie. Noile medicamente le-ar putea fi de folos mai ales celor bolnavi psihic sau pacientilor varstnici care se bazeaza pe o schema medicamentoasa complicata si care se afla intr-un mare pericol daca uita sa ia o pastila sau nu o iau atunci cand trebuie, relateaza “Daily Mail” in editia electronica de duminica.
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![Logical Data Structure [3]](https://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/crypto/passport/lds.png){kind=link}